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INTRODUCTION
International criminal law as prosecuted in the various
international tribunals focuses on mass atrocity crimes:
(1) genocide; (2) crimes against humanity; and (3) war crimes.1
As the Appeals Chamber of the Yugoslavian Tribunal has
explained, “most of the time these crimes do not result from the
criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute
manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes often carried
out by groups of individuals acting in pursuit of a common
* Professor, Vermont Law School.
1. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998. arts.
6–8, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (note that a definition of the Crime
of Aggression has been adopted, but not implemented); Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia
since 1991, arts. 2–5, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex, (May 3, 1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, arts. 2–4, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955, annex (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
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criminal design.”2 Despite the collective nature of these crimes,
international criminal law has adopted a model of individual
culpability.3 Some participants in a common criminal design or
plan may physically perpetrate a criminal act; others act in ways
that are vital to the commission of an offense. The principal task
under international criminal law is to assess the culpability of
each subgroup. This task requires fact gathering and sorting out
the precise acts of individuals in the midst of mass atrocity.4
While the definitions of international crimes may vary, the
issues raised above also play out across the terrain of forms of
participation.5 The responses of the international tribunals to
these issues have been varied and inconsistent. This Article will
consider the reasons why the doctrine regarding forms of
participation for collective crimes is incoherent, the precise
nature of the incoherence, and whether it is possible to
reconcile the various approaches to individual responsibility in
the context of collective criminality. It will conclude that while a
certain measure of coherence may be attained, full

2. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 191 (Int’l Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/
acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf.
3 . See 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL: NUREMBERG 14 NOVEMBER 1945 - 1 OCTOBER 1946, at 256 (1947)
(stating that decisions must be rendered “in accordance with well-settled legal
principles, one of the most important of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and
that mass punishments should be avoided.”). For consideration of different models of
criminal liability, see Andre Nollkaemper, Systemic Effects of International Responsibility for
International Crimes, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 313 (2010) [hereinafter Drumbl, Systemic
Effects]; Mark A. Drumbl, Accountability for System Criminality, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L.
373 (2010) [Drumbl, Accountability for Systemic Criminality] (“International criminal law
conceptually situates itself upon a fiction namely that wide-sale atrocity is the crime of
individuals. Such it may be, but it also is much more.”); Mark A. Drumbl, Pluralizing
International Criminal Justice, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1295 (2005) [Drumbl, Pluralizing
International Criminal Justice]; George P. Fletcher, Collective Guilt and Collective
Punishment, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 163 (2004).
4. See generally MARK OSIEL, MAKING SENSE OF MASS ATROCITY (2009).
5. These modes of responsibility are referred to in various ways. Professor Drumbl
describes them as “culpability mechanisms” and indicates that “[e]xamples might
include joint criminal enterprise, command responsibility, aiding and abetting; and
also injecting greater elasticity into juridical understandings of ‘committing,’
‘instigating,’ ‘ordering,’ and both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect co-perpetration’.” Drumbl,
Accountability for System Criminality, supra note 3, at 378 n.23. In this Article they will, in
accordance with the literature, be variously referred to as modes/forms of
responsibility, modes of liability, and forms of participation.
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reconciliation of the various models will probably continue to
elude the international criminal law.
I. SOURCES OF THE INCOHERENCE
There are many reasons for the failure of international
criminal law to coalesce around one theoretical/doctrinal
approach to crimes with multiple participants/perpetrators.
A. Multiple Decision Making Regimes
In 1993, the United Nations Security Council, acting in
response to the ongoing armed conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, created the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). 6 That ad hoc tribunal was
established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council and
charged under its founding statute with “prosecut[ing] . . .
persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991.”7 This was the first international criminal
tribunal since Nuremberg post-World War II. The ICTY statute
was intended to be largely a codification of customary
international law (“CIL”), its process a hybrid of civil and
common law traditions. Prosecutors and judges from both
traditions staffed the Tribunal.8 In 1994, the Security Council
created, as a second subsidiary organ, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”). In addition to these
international tribunals, and in response to specific mass
atrocities and armed conflicts, the international community
established a series of so-called “hybrid” tribunals in Cambodia,
Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Lebanon. 9 Each of these
6. S.C. Res. 808, ¶1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
7. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
8. See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal Procedure
in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 842–43 (2000); Patrick L. Robinson,
Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 569, 574–79 (2000).
9. See Laura Dickinson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003);
Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts: Local Empowerment and National Criminal
Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 347 (2006); Frederic Megret, In Defense of
Hybridity: Towards a Representational Theory of Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 725
(2005).
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international and ad hoc tribunals functioned under its own
founding document and while there are many similarities, there
are also many differences in these documents. 10 In 1998, a
permanent international criminal court was established by treaty
and came into being in 2002. The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court was a carefully negotiated
agreement that drew upon civil and common law traditions both
in terms of procedure and the substantive definitions of
crimes. 11 Also, as with the ad hoc tribunals, judges and
prosecutors represent both traditions.
Finally, adding to the diffuse nature of decision making
regarding international criminal law, domestic (national) courts
and tribunals also prosecute international crimes. There is a
long history of war crimes prosecutions at the national level. In
the United States, for example, violators of the laws of war have
long been tried in courts martial and military commissions.12 In
recent years states have enacted or broadened the reach of
domestic laws allowing prosecution for crimes against humanity
and genocide, both in response to specific atrocities and the
“complementarity” regime of the Rome Statute, under which
the ICC defers to domestic investigations and prosecutions of
international crimes. 13 The result is that multiple decision
makers in different tribunals with differing charges are
interpreting the same or similar international criminal law,
including the law regarding forms of responsibility in collective
crimes.

10. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 5 (defining crimes against humanity),
with ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 3 (defining crimes against humanity); Rome
Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 (defining crimes against humanity).
11. See THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of
Rome on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 443
(1999).
12. See, e.g., Scott Silliman, On Military Commissions, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 529
(2005).
13. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 1, 17; see Katherine L. Doherty & Timothy
L.H. McCormack, “Complementarity” as a Catalyst for Comprehensive Domestic Penal
Legislation, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L. L & POL’Y. 147 (1999); Michael P. Hatchell, Closing
Gaps in United States Law and Implementing the Rome Statute: A Comparative Approach, 12
ILSA J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 183 (2005).
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B. Nature of International Criminal Law
1. Strands of Law from which International Criminal Law is
Derived
Several factors add to the complexity of international
criminal law, and therefore the difficulty in consistently applying
it. First, international criminal law is a complex combination of
various strands of law. 14 It derives most directly from
International Humanitarian Law (“IHL”) or the Law of War,
which historically bounded states to conduct armed conflict
within certain legal parameters, and defined as war crimes
violations of those constraints.15 The Nuremberg Tribunal found
that the extensive history of both treaty and the customary law of
war also imposed international criminal responsibility on
individuals.16 In addition to IHL, a second strand of law from
which international criminal law derives is International Human
Rights Law. 17 The law of Human Rights manifests itself in
international criminal law in at least two ways. First, certain
substantive crimes are derived from human rights precepts
(particularly norms against discrimination). Crimes against
humanity and the crime of genocide both fit this model. 18
Second, international human rights law provides a rich source of
procedural protections for criminal defendants. Fundamental
14. This idea that various strands or threads of law have contributed to the
development of international criminal law is one that has been explored elsewhere. See,
e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal
Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005) (discussing “international criminal law as an outgrowth of
three legal traditions: domestic criminal law, international human rights law, and
transitional justice”).
15. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter, collectively, Geneva Conventions].
16. See Opinion and Judgement, United States, et al. v. Goering, et al., (October 1,
1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L LAW 172 (1947).
17. For a discussion of the tension between “victim centered” human rights law
and the “perpertrator centered” criminal law, see Danner & Martinez, supra note 14, at
87.
18. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6, 7.
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precepts such as nullum crimen sine lege (the presumption of
innocence), prohibitions against double jeopardy, and various
procedural protections at trial derive from well-established
norms of international human rights law.19 A third strand of law
from which international criminal law is derived is that of
domestic law. 20 In both the development of customary
international law and the drafting of treaties, those participating
in the formulation of international criminal law necessarily
bring to the table their own understanding of criminal law based
upon their legal tradition.
Several commentators have addressed the propriety of
adopting norms of domestic criminal law either wholesale into
international law or extrapolating from domestic law to derive
international criminal law.21 This is an issue addressed later in
this Article in the context of judicial interpretation of the Rome
Statute. 22 Given the differences in the nature of the crimes
generally addressed by international and domestic regimes and
the differing political, cultural and legal contexts in which such
crimes are prosecuted, there are good arguments against
assuming a domestic law approach will work at the international
level.23

19. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
20. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 14, at 83, for this discussion.
21. See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment:
The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43
STAN. J. INT’L L. 39 (2007) (“But application of the national law analogy proves
particularly problematic for ICL because it strives to combine the paradigms of two very
different legal fields: (1) classical international law – a profoundly consensual body of
law based on broadly shareable norms among nation-states and occupied mainly with
their rights and duties inter se; and (2) national criminal law – a profoundly coercive
body of law often understood to embody the most fundamental norms and values of a
local community, generally that of a single nation-state (or political subdivision).”).
22. See infra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
23. In addition to the threads identified above as contributing to the development
of international criminal law, an argument has been made by Andre Nollkemper that
the law of state responsibility is “better positioned to address systemic causes of
international crimes.” See Andre Nollkaemper, Systemic Effects of International
Responsibility for International Crimes, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 313, 314 (2010). But see
Allen S. Weiner, Working the System: A Comment on André Nollkaemper’s System Criminality
in International Law, 8 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 353 (2010); Julian Ku, How System
Criminality Could Exacerbate the Weaknesses of International Criminal Law, 8 SANTA CLARA J.
INT’L L. 365 (2010).
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2. Incompatibility of International Criminal Law with the
Traditional Emergence of CIL
Traditionally, customary international law norms are
formed by states generally and consistently engaging in a
uniform practice with the understanding that they are legally
obliged to do so. This sense of legal obligation is referred to as
opinio juris.24 This norm creation can take place over a long
period of time or a very short period of time, as in the case of socalled “instant” CIL,25 but the understanding is that at some
moment in time the general practice and opinio juris will
coalesce into a binding norm. This indeterminate and rather
vague process contrasts with, or is at least in tension with,
accepted tenets of international criminal law, which require
clarity and precision in defining crimes, which require that the
benefit of any doubt regarding that definition be given to the
defendant, and which prohibit ex post facto criminal liability
under the nullum crimen sine lege rule.26 This tension is most
recently apparent in the decision of the Cambodian Tribunal
regarding what CIL was established in the 1970s for purposes of
prosecutions currently taking place.27
3. Assessing Degree of Culpability
While one may be able to tease out of all major legal
systems a general rule that those who are more culpable should
be convicted and punished for the most serious crimes, the
actual process by which culpability is determined varies greatly

24. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. & Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43
(Feb. 20) (“Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis
of what was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would
be that within the period in question, short thought it might be, State practice,
including that of States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both
extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked;—and should
moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of
law or legal obligation is involved.”).
25 . See generally Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated
Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL
INT’L L.J. 439 (2010).
26. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22.
27. See infra notes 119–142 and accompanying text.
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from system to system. 28 This is especially true in assessing
individual responsibility for collective crimes, that is, crimes with
multiple perpetrators. This determination of culpability turns on
the characterization of principals versus accomplices, on the
nature of complicity, on aiding and abetting, and on whether
one is a co-perpetrator. It also turns on the weight to be
accorded the actus reus versus the mens rea of the crime. The
international tribunals that have considered these issues have
emphasized different factors and hence have differing views of
how to assess culpability and ultimately criminal responsibility.
C. The Process of Interpretation
Related to the first source of incoherence set out above, but
sufficiently different to be discussed separately, is the fact that
different tribunals have different ways of deciding upon and
interpreting the law of their founding documents, which
necessarily shapes the result reached. Even if the substantive
definitions of the crimes are essentially the same, interpretation
of the text may vary. For example, the ICTY is directed to
consider CIL, while the ICC is directed to its own statutory
language and only secondarily to CIL, and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) and other
hybrid courts are often directed to apply both international law
and domestic law. This has proved to be a particular issue in
defining modes of participation, which are often not expressly
provided for in the founding documents.29

28 . See generally Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International
Punishment: The Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International
Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39 (2007).
29. And, of course, to the extent that domestic courts are interpreting and
applying international criminal law, they are doing so through a prism of national
statutory and constitutional law accessed by judges who do not routinely deal with
international law. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557, 604–11 (2006) (“Finally,
international sources confirm that the crime charged here, is not a recognized
violation of the law of war. As observed above . . . none of the major treaties governing
the law of war identifies conspiracy as a violation thereof. And the only ‘conspiracy’
crimes that have been recognized by international war crimes tribunals . . . are
conspiracy to commit genocide and common plan to wage aggressive war, which is a
crime against the peace.”).
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II. WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE INCOHERENCE?
A. Nuremberg: Common Plans and Criminal Organizations
Any discussion of individual criminal responsibility under
international law has to begin with Nuremberg.30 The drafters of
the Nuremberg Charter sought to deal with the vast nature of
Nazi criminality in two principal ways.31 First, the Charter on its
face sets out conspiracy and common plan liability as forms of
participation. In Article 6(a), Crimes Against Peace, the drafters
included language that made an individual criminally
responsible for “naming, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation
in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any
of the foregoing.”32 In addition, the last paragraph of Article 6,
following the definitions of Crimes against Peace, Crimes against
Humanity and War Crimes, states: “Leaders, organizers,
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any
persons in execution of such plan.”33 These two excerpts appear
to create both a substantive crime of conspiracy, in the former,
and a form or mode of participation in the latter.
For reasons well documented elsewhere,34 the Nuremberg
Tribunal ruled that it had no jurisdiction to try persons for
participating in a common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes
30. Both the trials at Nuremberg and in Tokyo post-World War II applied law
agreed to by the Allies and the latter was based upon the design of the former. While
the crimes defined were generally the same, see, for example, Zachary D. Kaufman, The
Nuremberg Tribunal v. The Tokyo Tribunal: Designs, Staffs, and Operations, 43 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 753 (2010) for consideration of some of the differences.
31. The four allied powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
the Soviet Union—established the Nuremberg Tribunal in the so-called London
Agreement of August 8, 1945. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1951, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg
Charter].
32. Id. art. 6(a).
33. Id. art. 6.
34. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A
PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992) (providing a first-hand account of the conduct of the trials
before the Nuremberg Tribunal).
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against humanity or war crimes.35 Only eight of the twenty-two
defendants tried at the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg were convicted of conspiracy counts and only per
Article 6(a)—Crimes against Peace.36
The second way in which the Charter drafters sought to
deal with the enormity of the Nazi regime’s crimes was to allow
for the indictment and prosecution of certain organizations
under Articles 9 and 10. 37 At the trial of the individual
defendants, the plan was to have the Tribunal “declare [in
connection with any act of which the individual may be
convicted] that the group or organization of which the
individual was a member was a criminal organization.” 38
Subsequent to that, proof of individual membership in these
organizations would be per se criminal in “national, military, or
occupation” courts.39 The prosecution charged six groups or
organizations with crimes against the peace, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and criminal conspiracy.40 The plan was,
as indicated above, to have the Tribunal declare these groups
illegal and then members “would be subject to arrest and
prosecution before national courts based solely upon their
membership.”41 Crucially, the burden of proof would be on the
defendant to prove that membership was involuntary or that he
did not know of the group’s criminal purpose.42 Only three of
the groups were found by the Tribunal to be criminal
organizations.43 Hundreds of trials went forward in occupation
courts against members of these groups, but most of the
tribunals refused to shift the burden of proof and the
prosecution was thus left having to prove voluntariness and
35. See Opinion and Judgement, United States, et al. v. Goering, et al. (October 1,
1946), reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L LAW 172 (1947).
36. Id. at 331–33.
37. For a more complete discussion of the proposed criminality of organizations
under the Nuremberg Charter, see VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 784–87 (2d ed. 2011).
38. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 31, art. 9.
39. Id. art. 10.
40. The groups were: the Reich Cabinet, Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party,
General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces, the SS, the Gestapo,
and the SA (Stormtroopers).
41. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 37, at 784.
42. Id.
43. The groups were: the SS, the Gestapo, and the Leadership Corps of the Nazi
Party.
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knowledge, which, of course, largely nullified any benefit of the
planned process.44
B. Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine 45
1. Development of the Doctrine
Following prosecutions at the Tribunal in Nuremberg, no
international tribunal or court was convened until the ICTY.46
The ICTY and the ICTR were established as tribunals in
response to the specific contexts of mass violence in the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. Both tribunals were
created as subsidiary organs of the Security Council and operate
according to statutes adopted by that body.47
Neither of the founding Statutes referred to conspiracy or
common plan liability, except with regard to conspiracy to
commit genocide, which has since 1948 been specifically
provided for in the Genocide Convention.48 Reference to wellestablished CIL was to be made under both Statutes in applying
and interpreting the crimes.49 The Statutes were meant to codify
that CIL, in response to the ex post facto criticism of the crimes
prosecuted at Nuremberg.50
44. VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 37, at 786–87.
45. Much has been written about the doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise and
the case that generated the doctrine, but at least a brief summary is necessary here to
frame the larger discussion. See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra note 14; Scharf, supra
note 25; Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT’L
L. 1 (2011).
46. This is so despite post-World War II intentions to establish such a court as
reflected in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Sept. 12, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, art. 6 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]
(“Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall
be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was
committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with
respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction.”).
47. See ICTY Statute, supra note 1; ICTR Statute, supra note 1.
48. Genocide Convention, supra note 46, art. 3(b).
49. See ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (“The International Tribunal shall have
the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law . . . .”); ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (“The International
Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law . . . .”).
50. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Report of the
Secretary-General]; see also discussion infra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
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Dusko Tadić was the first defendant tried by the ICTY. He
was acquitted by the Trial Chamber of killing five civilians in the
village of Jaskići after the military group to which he belonged
had passed through the village on an ethnic cleansing mission.
In 1999, the Appeals Chamber reversed his acquittal on this
crime, finding first that the only reasonable conclusion the Trial
Chamber could have drawn is that the armed group to which
the Appellant belonged killed the five men in Jaskići.51 However,
the Appeals Chamber did acknowledge that the evidence did
not show that Tadić personally killed any of the men and
therefore the Chamber was left to decide: (i) whether the acts of
one person can give rise to the criminal culpability of another
where both participate in the execution of a common criminal
plan; and (ii) the degree of mens rea required in such a case.52
Although the ICTY statute does not mention common plan or
purpose or joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”), the Tribunal
found authorization for such a doctrine in Article 7(1) of the
statute, which provides: “A person who planned, instigated,
ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in
Articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually
responsible for the crime.”53
The Tadić Appeals Chamber read Article 7 broadly, finding
that it was meant to reach all forms of individual responsibility,
direct and indirect, that are supported by the express language
of the Statute (aiding and abetting) and by CIL, and that the
“object and purpose”54 of the Statute led to the conclusion that
“all those who have engaged in serious violations of
international humanitarian law, whatever the manner in which
they may have perpetrated, or participated in the perpetration
of those violations, must be brought to justice.” 55 The Appeals
Chamber then engaged in a detailed examination of post-World
War II case law at the Tribunal at Nuremberg, the Tokyo

51. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber,
para. 183 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
52. Id. para. 185.
53. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 7 para. 1.
54 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber,
para. 189 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
55. Id. para. 190.
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Tribunal and the occupation trials conducted by the Allies.56
The Chamber also looked to language in Article 25 of the Draft
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and to similar
language in the International Convention for the Suppression of
Terrorist Bombing.57 This examination persuaded the Chamber
that CIL supports individual criminal responsibility for those
who engage in a common plan and the Chamber further
distinguished three forms of such common plan or purpose
liability.
The basic form of JCE (“JCE I”) attributes individual
criminal liability when all co-defendants act pursuant to a
common plan or design and possess the same criminal intent,
even if each co-perpetrator carries out a different role within the
JCE. The mens rea for this form of JCE is the shared intent of all
members to commit a certain crime.58 The second form of JCE
(“JCE II”) is referred to as the “systemic” form and exists where
the participants are involved in a criminal plan that is
manifested by an institutional framework, such as a
concentration camp, involving an organized system of ill
treatment.59 JCE II is generally viewed as a variation of JCE I.
The actus reus of this variant “was the active participation in the
enforcement of a system of repression, as it could be inferred
from the position of authority and the specific functions held by
each accused.”60 The mens rea required is personal knowledge
of the system of ill treatment and intent to further this
concerted system.61
The third and most controversial form of JCE is the socalled “extended” form (“JCE III”). JCE III ascribes individual
criminal liability in situations involving a common design to
56. See discussion infra notes 127–143 and accompanying text.
57. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber
paras. 221–22 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
58 . Id. para. 196 (“The objective and subjective prerequisites for imputing
criminal responsibility to a participant who did not, or cannot be proven to have,
effected the killing are as follows: (i) the accused must voluntarily participate in one
aspect of the common design (for instance, by inflicting non-fatal violence upon the
victim, or by providing material assistance to or facilitating the activities of his coperpetrators); and (ii) the accused, even if not personally effecting the killing, must
nevertheless intend this result.”).
59. See id. para. 202.
60. Id. para. 203.
61. Id.
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commit a crime “where one of the perpetrators commits an act
which, while outside the common design, was nevertheless a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the effecting of that
common purpose.”62 The mens rea for JCE III combines the
shared intent of the perpetrators to achieve the common
criminal purpose and the “foreseeability of the possible
commission by other members of the group of offences that do
not constitute the object of the common criminal purpose.”63
The Tadić Appeals Chamber referred to this mens rea as
“advertent recklessness” 64 and it has been analogized to the
“felony murder doctrine” in common law jurisprudence,65 and
to Pinkerton type conspiracy under US law.66
In the illustration it offered of a JCE III situation, the
Appeals Chamber made clear the result it would reach on the
facts of Tadić. JCE III would exist, according to the Chamber,
where there is:
[A] common, shared intention on the part of a group to
forcibly remove members of one ethnicity from their town,
village or region . . . with the consequence that, in the
course of doing so, one or more of the victims is shot and
killed. While murder may not have been explicitly
acknowledged to be part of the common design, it was
nevertheless foreseeable that the forcible removal of
civilians at gunpoint might well result in the deaths of one
or more of those civilians.67

62. Id. para. 204.
63. Id. para. 220.
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 25.
66. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); see also Ohlin, supra note
45, at 703.
67. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement of the Appeals Chamber
paras. 204 (Int’l Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
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2. Critique of the JCE Doctrine68
The critique of JCE doctrine falls into two broad categories:
first, an argument that the Tadić interpretation of and reliance
upon the post-World War II case law as establishing CIL is
incorrect; and, second, a substantive critique of the doctrine
itself, particularly JCE III, as too indefinite, lacking clarity, too
broad, and inconsistent with basic tenets of criminal law. The
former category includes arguments that the ICTY improperly
interpreted Article 7(1) of its statute to encompass common
plan liability, and that the Tadić Appeals Chamber incorrectly
interpreted the post-World War II case law to support such a
doctrine. 69 For example, Professor Ohlin argues that “the
arguments offered by the ICTY Appeals Chamber for an
expansive reading of Article 7[, namely,] the object and purpose
of the ICTY Statute to prosecute the architects of war crimes, the
collective nature of genocide and war crimes, and the
international case law on collective criminal action” each
contain “deficiencies that cast doubt on the version of the
doctrine of joint criminal enterprise constructed by the Tadić
court.” 70 The second category of critique, while often also
objecting to the Tadić interpretation of the post-World War II
cases, focuses instead on the deficiencies of the JCE doctrine
itself. For example, Professors Danner and Martinez do not
wholly reject the ICTY’s use of JCE, they do, however, object to
the scope of the doctrine, the failure of the ICTY Appeals
Chamber to narrow the definition of an “enterprise,” and its
application to “specific intent” crimes.71

68. The “extended” form of Joint Criminal Enterprise (“JCE III”) has been a
controversial doctrine even within the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) itself. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T,
Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003) (espousing a
doctrine of co-perpetration at odds with the JCE doctrine). This decision was
overturned on appeal. Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006).
69. For a discussion of both of these arguments, see Jens David Ohlin, Three
Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 69
(2007).
70 Id. at 71.
71. Danner & Martinez, supra note 14, at 102–51.
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3. Other Tribunals and JCE
Following the decision in Tadić, the ICTR, applying a
statutory provision virtually identical to Article 7 of the ICTY
Statute, also applied JCE in all its forms.72 In addition, other
tribunals have applied forms of JCE, including the Special Court
for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”), Special Panels for the Trial of
Serious Crimes in East Timor, and most recently the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon (“Lebanon Tribunal”).73 Moreover, the
Iraqi Tribunal, which was a national court applying international
law, found JCE applicable;74 the US Supreme Court alluded to
the doctrine in a prosecution of a Guantanamo prisoner.75
C. Co-Perpetration in the International Criminal Court
1. Background Information on Individual Responsibility and the
ICC
Drafting of the Rome Statute, which created the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) was completed before the
ICTY had articulated the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise.
This treaty was finalized in 1998 and took effect on July 1, 2002,
when the requisite 60th State ratified it. Defining the limits of
individual responsibility had been carefully considered in
drafting the statute. Varying modes of liability were considered
and some were explicitly rejected. The Rome Statute contains a
detailed provision outlining the requirements for individual
criminal responsibility that reflects the compromises made in its
negotiations. Article 25 of the Statute provides in relevant part:
72. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgement (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda May 21, 1999). Note that many if not most of the ICTR
prosecutions have been for genocide and thus subject to the crime of “conspiracy to
commit genocide.” See also ICTR Statute, supra note 1, art. 6.
73. The Lebanon Tribunal interestingly found JCE to be a doctrine generally
supported by customary international law (“CIL”), not just under ICTY Article 7(a)
language. See Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy,
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/1 (Special Trib. for
Lebanon Feb. 16, 2011). It also noted in passing that the ICC’s alternative coperpetration based upon the “control theory” was not, unlike JCE, “not recognized in
customary international law.” Id. para. 18.
74. See Ian M. Ralby, Joint Criminal Enterprise in the Iraqi High Tribunal, 28 B.U.
INT’L L. J. 281 (2010).
75. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 58 U.S. 557, 611 n.40 (2006).
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In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly
with another or through another person, regardless of
whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a
crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a
crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its
attempted commission, including providing the means for
its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or
attempted commission of such a crime by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution
shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal
activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such
activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the
group to commit the crime . . . .76

2. The ICC Weighs In
Many scholars, including some who participated in the
drafting of the Rome Statute, anticipated that the ICC would use
the language of Article 25 to implement a form of JCE in the
new court.77 The first opportunity for the Court to address this
76. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3). Article 25 also makes provision for the
crime of incitement to commit genocide and attempt:
(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to
commit genocide;
(f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its
execution by means of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur
because of circumstances independent of the person’s intentions. However, a
person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents
the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this
Statute for the attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and
voluntarily gave the criminal purpose.
Id.
77 . See, e.g., William Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 103–04 (2d ed. 2004) (“Inspired by this provision in the Rome
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issue came in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges in the Lubanga case.78 The Prosecutor
charged Lubanga “with criminal responsibility under Article
25(3)(a) of this Statute, which covers the notions of direct
perpetration (commission of a crime in person), coperpetration (commission of a crime jointly with another
person) and indirect perpetration (commission through
another person, regardless of whether that other person is
criminally responsible).” 79 The Prosecution also referred to
Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute in submitting that, in
addition to Article 25(3)(a) liability, Lubanga was potentially
subject to Article 25(3)(d). The prosecutor “believe[d] that
‘common purpose’ in terms of Article (3)(d) could properly be
considered as a “third applicable mode of criminal liability,”
and therefore, “request[ed] that the Pre-Trial Chamber make
findings that the legal requirements of these three modes of
liability are either satisfied or not satisfied.”80 The Prosecution
made this request in light of the possibility that any one of these
theories might not prevail. In that case, it would “promote
efficiency” if the Prosecution could rely on a previous finding
that charges might be based on an alternative theory.81 The
Prosecution does, however, assert that “co-perpetration”
pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) “best represents the criminal

Statute, the judges of the ICTY have developed what has come to be known as ‘joint
criminal enterprise’ theory of liability, and it would seem plausible that ICC judges will
be strongly influenced by this case law in their application of Article 25.”); Danner &
Martinez, supra note 14, at 154 (“The Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC) states that an individual is criminally responsible for a crime if he
commits, orders, or aids and abets the crime, or ‘[i]n any other way contributes to the
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose.’
Thus, JCE, under one of its alternative names (common purpose doctrine) falls within
the ambit of the ICC Statute.”); Ohlin, supra note 69, at 77 (“It is perhaps laudable that
the Rome Statute includes a more detailed provision on joint criminal enterprise in
Article 25.”).
78. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 29, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc
266175.pdf.
79. Id. para. 318 (citing Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC‐01/04‐01/06‐
356‐Conf‐Anx1, Documents Containing the Charges para. 27 (Aug. 28, 2006)).
80 . Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Document
Containing the Charges para. 12(ii) (Aug. 28, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc192552.pdf.
81. Id.
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responsibility for crimes with which Thomas Lubanga Dyilo is
charged.”82
The Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”) made two early
determinations that influenced its final decision. First, it
decided that if it finds that there is criminal responsibility for
defendant Lubanga as a co-perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a),
“the question as to whether it may also consider the other forms
of accessory liability provided for in Articles 25(3)(b) to (d) of
the Statute or the alleged superior responsibility of Thomas
Dyilo Lubanga under Article 28 [would] become[] moot.”83
Note that in making this determination, the PTC foreshadowed
its later conclusion that Article 25(3)(d) provides for a form of
accessory liability only and rendered its discussion of 25(3)(d)
dicta. Second, in focusing on the concept of co-perpetration as
set out in Article 25(3)(a) and finding it:
[R]ooted in the idea that when the sum of co-ordinated
individual contributions of a plurality of persons results in
the realisation of all the objective elements of a crime, any
person making a contribution can be held vicariously
responsible for the contributions of all the others and, as a
result, can be considered as a principal to the whole crime.84

The PTC concluded that “the definitional criterion of the
concept of co-perpetration is linked to the distinguishing
criterion between principals and accessories to a crime where a
criminal offence is committed by a plurality of persons.”85
What the Chamber seems to mean here is that the criterion
that they will adopt as key to co-perpetration will distinguish that
form of joint liability from accessory liability (i.e., if you meet
this criterion then principal liability will attach under Article
25(3)(a)). This does not, on its face, seem to preclude asserting
principal liability under another provision, Article 25(3)(d)
being the most likely, though that is where the PTC seems to
end up.
82 . Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Document
Addressing Matters that Were Discussed at the Confirmation Hearing para. 27 (Dec. 4,
2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc243643.pdf.
83. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges para. 321 (Jan. 29, 2007).
84. Id. para. 326.
85. Id. para. 327.
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The PTC then considered three possible approaches to the
distinction between principal and accessory liability upon which
the Article 25(3)(a) category of co-perpetration will depend.
The first is the objective approach, which focuses on the
completion of objective elements of the crime (i.e., the actus
reus), so that “only those who physically carry out one or more
of the objective elements of the offence can be considered
principals to the crime. 86 The second is the “subjective
approach,” which the PTC identifies with the ICTY and its JCE
jurisprudence. This approach “moves the focus from the level of
contribution to the commission of the offence as the
distinguishing criterion between principals and accessories, and
places it instead on the state of mind in which the contribution
to the crime was made.”87 The PTC concludes that only those
with the “shared intent” to commit the crime “can be
considered principals to the crime, regardless of the level of
their contribution to the commission.”88 The third approach,
and the one adopted by the Chamber, is what the opinion
characterizes as the “concept of control.” 89 This approach,
which the Chamber contends is applied in numerous legal
systems but which is largely based upon German law,90 maintains
that principals to a crime include not only those who physically
perpetrate the objective elements of a crime, but “also . . . those
who, in spite of being removed from the scene of the crime,
control or mastermind its commission because they decide
whether and how the offence will be committed.”91 Note that in
explaining these approaches and their relevance to drawing a
line between principal and accessorial liability, the PTC glosses

86. Id. para. 328.
87. Id. para. 329.
88 . Id. This conclusion by the Pre-Trial Chmber (“PTC”) does not seem
adequately to recognize the required actus reus for JCE in its various forms and thus
presents an overly simplified view of that doctrine. It is not all clear that the application
of JCE precludes a finding of accessorial liability in a given case.
89. Id. para. 330.
90. The Chamber essentially cites German law and literature, or cases citing
German law, in support of its decision. See, e.g., id. paras. 346–48 and accompanying
footnotes.
91. Id.

522 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:501
over the conflict that exists regarding them in the German
domestic law and commentary upon which it relies.92
The PTC spends a great deal of time defining the “concept
of control,” noting that it has both an objective and a subjective
element: the former “consisting of the appropriate factual
circumstances for exercising control over the crime” and the
latter “consisting of the awareness of such circumstances.”93 The
PTC concludes that this approach characterizes as principals
only those who have “control over the commission of the
offense—and are aware of having such control.”94
The PTC further distinguishes Article 25(3)(a) from
(3)(d), “which is closely akin to the concept of joint criminal
enterprise or common purpose doctrine adopted by the
jurisprudence of the ICTY,” by concluding that Article 25(3)(d)
applies only to accessorial liability and a “residual form of
accessory liability” applicable only if 25(3)(b) or (c) does not
apply.95 This conclusion is not self-evident from the language of
the statute, nor widely shared. An argument could certainly be
made that Article 25(3)(d) could provide for another form of
principal liability, particularly in a large-scale crime based upon
a common plan versus the type of co-perpetration provided for
in Lubanga.96 Once the PTC had decided to embrace the notion
92. For a comprehensive and excellent exploration of the control theory of
perpetration, see Neha Jain, The Control Theory of Perpetration in International Law, 12
CHI. J. INT’L L. 159 (2011).
93. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges para. 331 (Jan. 29, 2007).
94. Id. para. 332. This is so “because: i. they physically carry out the objective
elements of the offence (commission of the crime in person or direct perpetration); ii.
they control the will of those who carry out the objective elements of the offince
(commission of the crime through another person, or indirect perpetration; or iii.
They have along with others, control over the offence by reason of the essential tasks
assigned to them (commission of the crime jointly with others, or co-perpetration).” Id.
95. Id. paras. 335–37.
96. That section could also be read as providing an alternative and not subsidiary
form of liability: “Indeed in Furundzija, the ICTY held that these provisions confirm
that international (criminal) law recognizes a distinction between aiding and abetting a
crime and participation in a common criminal plan as ‘two separate categories of
liability for criminal participation . . . – co-perpetrators who participate in a joint
criminal enterprise, on the one hand, and aiders and abettors, on the other.’” Kai
Ambos, Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 475, 484 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed.
2008). Indeed, the Appeals Chamber in Tadić went to great lengths to distinguish the
JCE doctrine it was announcing from aiding and abetting under the ICTY Statute:
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of the concept of control as a distinguishing feature of principal
versus accessory liability, the PTC “considers that the concept of
co-perpetration embodied in Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute
coincides with that of joint control over the crime by reason of
the essential nature of the various contributions to the
commission of the crime.”97 Key to the application of this model
to joint or co-perpetration by two or more persons is the idea
that no one perpetrator need exercise overall control over the
offense, but that they share control in the sense that each of
them “could frustrate the commission of the crime by not
carrying out his or her task.”98
Following the decision in Lubanga concerning the control
theory of co-perpetration, the ICC PTC in the Katanga & Chui
case extended this doctrine to encompass joint indirect
perpetration, a much more controversial version of the control
theory. 99 As Professor Jain notes, the “heavy reliance of the
In light of the preceding propositions it is now appropriate to distinguish
between acting in pursuance of a common purpose or design to commit a
crime, and aiding and abetting.
(i) The aider and abettor is always an accessory to a crime perpetrated by
another person, the principal.
(ii) In the case of aiding and abetting no proof is required of the existence of
a common concerted plan, let alone of the pre-existence of such a plan. No
plan or agreement is required: indeed, the principal may not even know
about the accomplice’s contribution.
(iii) The aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist,
encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific
crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian
property, etc.) and this support has a substantial effect upon the perpetration
of the crime. By contrast, in the case of acting in pursuance of a common
purpose or design, it is sufficient for the participant to perform acts that in
some way are directed to the furthering of the common plan or purpose.
(iv) In the case of aiding and abetting, the requisite mental element is
knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the
commission of a specific crime by the principal. By contrast, in the case of
common purpose or design more is required (i.e., either intent to perpetrate
the crime or intent to pursue the common criminal design plus foresight that
those crimes outside the criminal common purpose were likely to be
committed) as stated above.
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, para. 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
97. Id. para. 341.
98. Id. para. 342.
99. See Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01//07, Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges paras. 495–99 (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf.
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Katanga and Chui Pre-Trial Chamber on theory of
Organisationsherrschaft is controversial, given that this theory
does not enjoy wide support in domestic legal systems, with the
exception of Germany and a few Latin American states that are
heavily influenced by German legal doctrine.”100 It is noteworthy
that “the Chamber cites Claus Roxin almost exclusively in its
elucidation of the elements of the doctrine.”101
3. Critiques of the ICC’s Control Theory of Perpetration
Professor Jain’s article has many interesting things to say
about the control theory of perpetration and its potential to
provide a nuanced approach to the complex questions
surrounding modes of liability in international criminal law. She
does, however, have several concerns with the ICC Pre-Trial
Chamber’s embrace of this theory. Among them, she notes that
the “sparseness of the elements outlined by Lubanga makes it
difficult to assess how they would be applied to concrete cases
before the court.” 102 In addition, she points out that over
reliance on one theory of control, Roxin’s, which has wide
support in the scholarly community but has not been adopted
by the German courts, is problematic, as is the Katanga PTC’s
reliance on indirect co-perpetration, when “there is
considerable debate even in German academic circles about the
viability of the doctrine” since “[t]he individual elements of the
doctrine . . . have been subjected to considerable criticism,
and prominent academics in Germany reject the application of
the doctrine altogether in favor of co-perpetration and even
secondary responsibility for instigation.”103
Regarding the issue Professor Jain characterizes as the
“substantive issue of whether these are theoretically sound
modes of liability that the ICC can legitimately adopt for
international crimes,” several concerns have been raised by
scholars.104 Yet, there is also a procedural objection to the ICC’s
100. Jain, supra note 92, at 184.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 183.
103. Id. at 186.
104. See, e.g., Ohlin, supra note 45 (rejecting control as the basis for liability under
Article 25 and arguing that a theory of “Joint Intentions” would restore mens rea to a
central role in developing a dotrine to govern individual liability for collective crimes).
But see Jain, supra note 92, at 186 (extensively critiquing Ohlin’s critique); see also
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interpretation of Article 25. The PTCs have seemingly ignored
the direction given to the Court in Article 21 regarding which
law is to be applied in the Court. In the name of applying the
language of “this Statute,” the PTC actually applies, without
adequate explanation, a narrow doctrine not widely accepted,
nor supported explicitly or implicitly by the travaux preparatoires
or international law more generally. 105 This issue will be
explored more fully in Part IV of this Article.
D. The Cambodian Tribunal’s Decision Regarding JCE
The last piece of incoherence in the doctrine derives from
the decision in May 2010, by the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), a hybrid court charged with
trying “those most responsible” for crimes of the Khmer Rouge,
thirty-five years after the fact.106 That court decided that the CIL
between 1975 and 1979 supported the application of JCE I and
JCE II, but not that of JCE III. The context of this decision was
an appeal of the Co-Investigative Judges Order on JCE
concerning the:
[O]ngoing judicial investigation against NUON Chea, IENG
Sary, IENG Thirith, KHIEU Samphan and KAING Guek Eav
alias “Duch” relating to charges of crimes against humanity
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions dated 12
August 1949, offences defined and punishable under
Articles 5, 6, 29 (new) of the law on the Establishment of the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, dated
27 October 2004 (“ECCC Law”).107
OSIEL, supra note 4, at 33–65 (critiquing the indirect perpetration model relied on in
Katanga).
105. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21.
106. See Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea, Royal Decree No. NS/RKM/0801/12, art. 1 (Aug. 10, 2001)
(Cambodia):
The purpose of this law is to bring to trial senior leaders of Democratic
Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious
violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and
custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were
committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979.
107 . Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC38), Public Decision on the
Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, para. 1
(May 20, 2010) (Cambodia).
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This appeal sought to quash the order of the CoInvestigating Judges that the doctrine of Joint Criminal
Enterprise was applicable law in the ECCC.108 The defendants
argued that JCE should be inapplicable because:
such application would violate the principle of legality
because JCE was not acknowledged as customary
international law before or during the period of 19751979,nor is it presently recognized as such and 2)JCE is not
specified in the ECCC Establishment Law, nor is it a part of
Cambodian law or recognized by any international
convention enforceable before the ECCC.109

After resolving various procedural matters, the PTC reached the
merits of the defendants’ appeal.
The PTC first cited the Tadić decision, its three categories
of JCE and its understanding of the common actus reus for all
three types of JCE, “namely: (i) a common plan . . . ; (ii)
involving a plurality of persons[;] and (iii) an individual
contribution by the charged person or accused to the execution
of the common plan . . . .”110 The Chamber also sets out the
variations in mens rea established earlier, which attach to each
form of JCE and characterizes the “concept of JCE as a form of
criminal responsibility in international law” as a “unique” one,
which “combines features from different legal traditions and has
been applied and shaped by actors from varying legal
backgrounds.”111 The Chamber makes reference to prosecutors
and judges at the post-World War II commissions and tribunals
who:
applied the concepts on responsibility established in the
Nuremberg Charter and Control Council No. 10 not only to
impose responsibility on those perpetrators who physically
committed acts for their violations of humanitarian law, but
also on those individuals who, pursuing a common design
with others, participated in the commission of such
crimes(s).112

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. para. 2.
Id.
Id. para. 38.
Id. paras 39–40.
Id. para. 40.
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Some of those crimes, the Chamber noted, involved mob
violence against Allied military and resistance forces in which
the crimes were physically committed by individuals who shared
a common intent with the accused, who was not remote from
the perpetration of the crime. The tribunal also identified
crimes “perpetrated on a broader scale and involving state
agents, the persons convicted were usually remote from the
physical perpetration of the crimes and no consideration was
given to the criminal responsibility or even state of mind of the
perpetrators.”113
The Chamber acknowledged that the relevant Cambodian
law of the 1970s, which was based upon the civil law, did
recognize a form of “co-perpetration,” which resembles JCE I
and II in that it treats as co-perpetrators “not only those who
physically perform the actus reus of the crime, but also those who
possess the mens rea for the crime and participate or contribute
to its commission.”114 However, these two doctrines, JCE and coperpetration, are not co-extensive, since JCE would appear to
embrace situations in which the accused is “more remote from
‘actual perpetration of the’ crime than the direct perpetration
required under domestic law.”115
In establishing the framework for its decision, the Tribunal
makes reference to Article 33 (2) (new) of the ECCC Law, which
requires that the “ECCC shall exercise its jurisdiction in
accordance with international standards of justice, fairness and
due process of law, as set out in Articles 14 and 15 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(“ICCPR”).”116 The PTC referred specifically to the principle of
nullum criimen sine lege found in Article 15(1).117 The Chamber
set out four pre-conditions that therefore must be satisfied in
order for a particular form of criminal responsibility to fall
within the ECCC’s jurisdiction:

113. Id.
114. Id. para. 41.
115. Id.
116. Id. para. 43.
117. Id.; see International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights art. 15(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on
account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense, under
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.”).
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(i) it must be provided for in the [ECCC Law], explicitly or
implicitly;
(ii) it must have existed under customary international law
at the relevant time;
(iii) the law providing for that form of liability must have
been sufficiently accessible at the relevant time to anyone
who acted in such a way;
(iv) such person must have been able to foresee that he
could be held criminally liable for his actions if
apprehended.118

In applying these pre-conditions, the Chamber first rejected
arguments by the defense that the OCIJ erred in finding that the
ECCC could apply customary international law. The defense
based this argument on the fact that the ECCC is in essence a
domestic Cambodian court in a country adhering to a dualist
system, without “specific directives in the Constitution,
legislation or national jurisprudence incorporating customary
law into domestic law.”119 The Chamber concluded that Article 2
of the ECCC Law provided jurisdiction to apply forms of
responsibility recognized by customary international law at the
relevant time.120 Having found that the ECCC had jurisdiction
both to prosecute these defendants for violations of IHL, and to
apply CIL, the Chamber then turned to what it characterized as
the “core of the Appeals, that is whether there was in 1975–1979
a customary law basis for JCE and, in the alternative, its
systematic and extended forms, and if so, whether these
form(sic) of responsibility were sufficiently accessible and
foreseeable to the Charged Persons.”121

118 . Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC38), Public Decision on the
Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, para.
43 (May 20, 2010) (Cambodia).
119. Id. para. 48.
120. Id.
121. Id. para. 50.
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1. Was JCE a Recognized Form of Criminal Responsibility under
CIL Prior to 1975?
Despite some initial confusing language with regard to
determining when CIL exists,122 the Chamber cites the Statute of
the International Court of Justice for language regarding the
legitimacy of CIL as a source of international law, which requires
the court to apply “international custom, as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law.”123 The Chamber finds that, in
terms of state practice, “‘not only must the acts concerned
amount to a settled practice, but they must be such, or be
carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.’” 124 The Chamber then engaged in a full
consideration of the Tadić Appeals Judgment. It noted that the
Order appealed in this case “logically refers to the above ICTY
seminal decision on JCE as persuasive authority for its
conclusion that, ‘[c]onsidering the international aspects of the
ECCC and the fact that the jurisprudence relied upon in
articulating JCE pre-existed the events under investigation at the
ECCC, there is a basis under international law for applying JCE
before the ECCC.’”125
The PTC then proceeded to differentiate JCE I and II from
JCE III. As to the former, which the Chamber characterized as
“basic and systemic forms of JCE,” the Chamber refused to limit
its assessment of “whether Tadić incorrectly” found JCE liability
to a consideration of the authorities relied upon by the Appeals
Chamber in that case.126 Instead, the ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber
found the Tadić opinion:

122. See, e.g., id. para. 53 (“When determining the state of customary international
law in relation to the existence of a crime or form of individual responsibility, a court
shall assess existence of ‘common, consistent and concordant’ state practice or opinio
juris . . . .”).
123. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, para. 1, June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (annexed to U.N. Charter).
124 . Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC38), Public Decision on the
Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, para.
53 (May 20, 2010) (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. & Ger./Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 3, 77 (Feb. 20)) (Cambodia).
125. Id. para. 54.
126. Id. para. 57.
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“[R]einforced by the use made of the doctrine of common
plan or enterprise in . . . .”: 1) Article 6 of the London
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (“London
Charter” or the “Nuremberg Charter”), providing that
persons “participating in the formulation or execution of a
Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit crimes against
peace, war crimes, or crimes against humanity are
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in
execution of such plan”; and 2) the Control Council Law
No. 10, which was a legislative act jointly passed in 1945 by
the four Occupying Powers, reflecting international
agreement among the Great Powers on the law applicable to
international crimes and the jurisdiction of the military
courts called upon to rule on such crimes, providing that
both the principal perpetrator and a person “connected
with plans or enterprises involving” the commission of a
crime were considered to have ‘committed’ that crime.127

The PTC concluded that these instruments show an
intention to find criminal liability for one who does not
physically perpetrate a crime, but intentionally participates in
the formulation or execution of a common plan. Therefore,
“[t]his constitutes undeniable support of the basic and systemic
forms (JCE I and II) of JCE liability.”128
Regarding the preliminary question of whether judicial
decisions should form the basis for determining customary
international law, the PTC found such case law to be “an
authoritative interpretation of their constitutive instruments”
and that it “can be relied upon to determine the state of
customary international law with respect to the existence of JCE
as a form of criminal responsibility” at the time relevant for this
case. 129 The chamber then considered the eight cases relied
upon by Tadić in support of JCE I and II.130 It also accepted the
127. Id.
128. Id. para. 58.
129. Id. para. 60.
130. Id. paras. 62–63 (citing The Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others, British
Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland on 2426 November, 1945, reprinted in 1 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 35 (1947); Hoelzer et al., 1 CANADIAN MILITARY COURT
AURICH GERMANY, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 25 MARCH-6 APRIL, 1946, at 341, 347, 349
(RCAF Binder 181.009) (D2474); Trial of Gustav Alfred Jepsen and Others, reprinted in
PROCEEDINGS OF A WAR CRIMES TRIAL HELD AT LUNEBERG, GERMANY (13-23 AUGUST,
1946), Judgement of 24 August 1946 (original transcripts in Public Record Office, Kew,
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representation of the OCP that there are “more relevant postWorld War II international military cases than the ones cited by
Tadić and considered two of those to be particularly relevant.131
Ultimately, the PTC concluded that, “[i]n the light of the
London Charter, Control Council Law No. 10, international
cases and authoritative pronouncements” there is “no doubt
that JCE I and JCE II were recognized forms of responsibility in
customary international law at the time relevant for Case 002.”132
Moreover, because these forms of responsibility were recognized
in CIL, and were forms the Chamber held to “have an
underpinning in the Cambodian law concept of co-authorship
applicable at the time,” such liability was “sufficiently accessible
and foreseeable to the defendants.”133
The PTC finally addressed the “more controversial form of
JCE”134—JCE III. The defendants here argued that JCE III was
not supported by customary international law and that its
application would therefore violate the principle of legality.
Support for the JCE III doctrine was lacking, the Appellants
argued, because in the World War II cases cited, “the military
courts only issued a simple guilty verdict and made no extensive

Richmond); Trial of Franz Schonfeld and Others, in British Military Court, Essen, June 11-26,
1946, reprinted in 11 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra, at 68; Trial of
Feurstein and Others, reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF A WAR CRIMES TRIAL HELD AT
HAMBURG, GERMANY (4-24 AUGUST, 1948), Judgement of 24 August 1948 (original
records in Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond); United States v. Ohlenforf et al.,
reprinted in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 3 (1951); Trial of Martin Gottfried Weiss and
Thirty-nine Others, General Military Government Court of the United States Zone, Dachau,
Germany, 15 November-13 December, 1945, reprinted in 11 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra, at 5; Trial of Josef Kramer and 44 others, British Military Court, Luneberg,
17 September-17 November, 1945, reprinted in 2 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra, at 1 (1945)).
131. Id. para. 65 (“The Pre-Trial Chamber finds two of the Control Council law
No. 10 cases, the Justice and RuSHA cases, to be particularly apposite to determining
whether the basic and systemic forms of JCE (JCE I & II) formed part of customary
international law at the time relevant for Case 002. These cases have been discussed
extensively by the ICTR Appeals Chamber, who inter alia relied on these sources to
conclude that, as of 1992, customary international law permitted the imposition of
criminal liability on a participant in a common plan to commit genocide.”).
132. Id. para. 69.
133. Id. para. 72.
134. Id. para. 74.
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legal finding on the issue of common criminal plan.”135 The
Appellants also argued that Tadić:
‘relied in large part on unpublished cases, mostly from Italy
[ . . .] which has adopted a unitary system whereby any
person who intervenes in the commission of a crime is liable
as a perpetrator, whereas most national criminal law systems
have adopted an approach that makes a distinction between
perpetrators or principals to the crime and accessories to
the crime or secondary parties. . . .’136

The OCP countered that the Appellants’ arguments ignore
substantial evidence supporting the Tadić finding of JCE III and
argued that “‘many advanced jurisdictions recognized modes of
co-perpetration similar to JCE III, [including] conspiracy, the
felony murder doctrine, the concept of association de malfaiteurs
and numerous other doctrines of co-perpetration.’”137
The PTC agreed with the Appellants that the authorities
relied upon by Tadić “do not provide sufficient evidence of
consistent state practice or opinio juris at the time relevant to”
the Cambodian prosecution.138 The Chamber “concludes that
JCE III was not recognized as a form of responsibility applicable
to violations of international humanitarian law” for several
reasons.139 First, neither the Nuremberg Charter nor Control
Council Law No. 10 specifically provide for JCE III.140 Second,
the Chamber discounted the Tadić reliance on post-World War
II cases,141 finding that while the facts in those cases might be
consistent with a finding of JCE III, “in the absence of a
reasoned judgement in these cases, one cannot be certain of the
basis of liability actually retained by the military courts.” 142
135. Id. para. 75.
136. Id. (citing Ieng Sary Appeal, para. 40) (alterations in original).
137. Id. para. 76.
138. Id. para. 77.
139. Id.
140 . Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ(PTC38), Public Decision on the
Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise,
para. 78 (May 20, 2010) (Cambodia) (finding the two other international instruments
relied upon by Tadić were not relevant since they were not in existence in the relevant
time period of 1975–1979).
141. See, e.g., Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others (Essen Lynching Case), British Military
Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen, dec. 18-19 and 21-22 1945, reprinted in 1 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 130, at 1.
142. Id. para. 79.
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Third, the Chamber found that the Italian war crimes cases
relied upon by the ICTY were not appropriate precedents for
establishing CIL because they took place in domestic courts and
applied domestic law and do not, therefore constitute
international case law.143
The PTC also went on to consider whether general
principles of criminal law supported the Tadić tribunal’s finding
of JCE III, finding “a number of ICTY Appeals decisions state or
imply that it is acceptable to have recourse to such principles in
defining not only the elements of an international crime, but
also the scope of a form of responsibility for an international
crime.” 144 The PTC made clear its understanding that Tadić
itself:
only referred to national legislation and case law to show
that the notion of common purpose upheld in international
law has an underpinning in many national systems. . . .
[T]hese domestic sources could not be relied upon as
irrefutable evidence of international principles or rules
under the doctrine that general principles of law are
recognized by the nations of the world; for this reliance to
be permissible, most, if not all, countries must have adopted
the same notion of common purpose. In Tadić, the court
concluded that this was not the case.145

Therefore, the Chamber finds JCE III is not applicable
before the ECCC.146
III. ANALYSIS: CAN THE INCOHERENCE BE MADE
COHERENT AND WHY DOES THAT MATTER?
To take the second question first, it matters for several
reasons. First, coherent and clear definitions of crimes,
including forms of responsibility/modes of participation in
143. Id. para. 82.
144. Id. para. 84 (citing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95/1-T, Trial
Judgement, para. 177 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998)
(holding that “to arrive at an accurate definition of rape based on the criminal law of
specificity . . ., it is necessary to look for principles of criminal law common to the
major legal systems. These principles may be derived, with all due caution, from
national laws,”); Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgement, paras.
34–42 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004)).
145. Id. para. 85.
146. Id. para. 88.
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crimes, go to the question of the credibility of international
criminal law and the international criminal justice system.
Having the same behavior charged and punished differently
depending upon the tribunal in which the case is heard makes it
difficult to argue that ICL and the international justice system
are a mature regime. Moreover, the nullum crimen sine lege rule
requires that there be a clear, definite statement of the law
before a defendant can be charged with a crime.147 And yet, the
current disarray in the doctrine shows no signs of being resolved
any time soon.
A. Does Co-Perpetration per the ICC “Win”?
The PTCs of the ICC have now definitively rejected joint
criminal enterprise as the framework for charging those who
commit a crime collectively. The PTCs have instead elected to
adopt a form of co-perpetration based upon “control” as the
only form under which perpetrators may be charged as
principals. The PTC, at least in Lubanga, has expressly rejected
JCE III—the extended form—but its rationale seems also to be
inconsistent with JCE I and II, at least as forms of principal
liability. Those latter two forms have quite broad acceptance,
pre- and post-Lubanga, not just in the ICTY and the ICTR, but
also in the various hybrid courts, even those, such as the ECCC,
which reject JCE III. This is perhaps so because these forms,
particularly JCE I (and JCE II if it is viewed as a subset or
variation of JCE I), find broad support in the domestic law of
states and, arguably, in CIL.
Although the Rome Statute does create a permanent
international criminal court with, perhaps, the goal of having
such a court be the ultimate arbiter of international criminal law
doctrine, such an outcome seems unlikely in the short term—or
even the near long term. This is so for the following reasons.

147. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(2) (“The definition of a crime
shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity,
the definition shall be interpreted in favor of the person being investigated, prosecuted
or convicted.”).
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1. Complementarity
Key to the regime created by the Rome Statute is the
principle of complementarity. This principle is expressed in
Article I of the Statute, establishing the international criminal
court and making it “complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.”148 Article 17 of the Statute sets out the details of
the “complementarity” principle. It provides that the Court shall
not take jurisdiction over a case where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or
unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or
prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated
jurisdiction over it and the State
prosecute the person concerned,
resulted from the unwillingness or
genuinely to prosecute.149

by a State which has
has decided not to
unless the decision
inability of the State

Article 17 further identifies “unwillingness” to investigate
or prosecute as involving situations in which “proceedings were
or are being undertaken . . . for the purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court”; [t]here has been an unjustified
delay”; or “the proceedings were not or are not being
conducted independently or impartially and they were or are
being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to
justice.”150 In ascertaining “inability” to investigate or prosecute,
Article 17(3) directs that the “Court shall consider whether, due
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry
out its proceedings.”151
The consequence of these provisions is that the Court must
defer to States which seek to investigate and prosecute
international crimes. This is key to the scheme of the ICC, which
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. art. 1.
Id. art. 17.
Id.
Id.
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thus encourages States to enact domestic law under which they
may prosecute international crimes committed on their territory
and/or by their own citizens. 152 Some States will, of course,
assert jurisdiction more broadly under so-called “universal
jurisdiction” statutes, which permit them, to the extent allowed
by international law, 153 to prosecute even those without
nationality or territoriality links to the forum.154 This means, of
course, that as States prosecute crimes against humanity, war
crimes and genocide in domestic courts, those courts will find it
necessary to interpret the various precepts of ICL, including the
substantive crimes themselves and forms of participation.
Nothing would bind such a domestic court to the interpretations
of the ICC, for example to choosing co-perpetration based on a
control model. In fact, history would suggest instead that States
would make reference to CIL in defining these terms.
2. The Infrequency of Decision Making by the ICC
Given its limited resources, political constraints, and its
charge to “exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern,”155 the decisions of the
Court will be few and far between. The record of the Court thus
far is very sparse.156 Even preliminary decisions by the PTCs are
few.157 It will take decades for the Court to establish even the
most basic of interpretations of the Rome Statute. While having
a permanent court is meant to address both the logistical
difficulties of establishing ad hoc tribunals to deal with mass
atrocities after the fact and thereby to deter future crimes and

152. See generally Doherty & McCormack, supra note 13.
153. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3,
24 (Feb. 14) (holding that sitting foreign ministers are immune from prosecution
under another State’s universal jurisdiction statute).
154. Though States with the broadest statutes have in recent years yielded to
international political pressure and have narrowed the reach of their universal
jurisdiction statutes. See generally Steven Ratner, Belgium’s War Crimes Statute: A
Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 888 (2003).
155. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 1.
156. As of February, 2014 only eighteen cases in eight situations have been
brought before the Court.
157. For the most recent summary of the current status of cases, see Situations and
Cases, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations and cases/
Pages/situations and cases.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
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criminals by establishing a forum to provide swift and certain
justice, the reality of such a scheme seems far off.
3. Ad Hoc/Hybrid Tribunals Will Continue to Play a Role
One of the consequences of the Court’s limitations will
probably be continued use of ad hoc tribunals. Even as the
tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda wind down and
prepare to turn their prosecutions over to national courts under
their completion strategies, more use is being made of hybrid
tribunals.158 These hybrid tribunals have continued to be created
even after establishment of the ICC. 159 Along with domestic
courts, these hybrid courts supplement, and complement, the
work of the ICC. They have the advantage of being tailored for a
specific situation, taking into account the cultural, and local
political aspects of the conflict involved. They also may be
viewed as more legitimate by citizens of the State involved, as
opposed to a tribunal far away.160 Judges for the State involved
also may add to the credibility of the decision making in the eyes
of the populace. There may be disadvantages to such tribunals
as well, hence the determination of the international
community to create a permanent court. And, as with domestic
courts, these courts have not been and may not be bound by any
interpretations of ICL set forth by the ICC.161
B. The Role of Interpretation in Making the Incoherent Coherent
Related to, but somewhat different from the preceding
section, which addressed the fact that different tribunals apply
different law in different contexts, is the issue that each of the
tribunals has interpreted its constitutive document as having
dictated the methodology for interpretation and application of
law to the alleged crimes. There are several models in the ad
158. See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res. 1534,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
159. For example, the Lebanon Tribunal was created in 2007 to prosecute those
responsible for the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri and twenty-two others. See Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/
lebanon/tribunal/timeline.shtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
160. See Dickinson, supra note 9.
161. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T,
Judgement (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber Mar. 2, 2009) (embracing
JCE in all forms).
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hoc and permanent tribunals. These have been alluded to
earlier, but deserve a more complete consideration since they
are key to the particular issue of forms of participation. First, the
ICTY and the ICTR are charged by their founding documents
with applying the stated crimes consistently with customary
international law.162 The report of the Secretary-General on the
establishment of the ICTY clearly intends that the statute of new
court be viewed as having codified existing CIL and thus as
answering any nullum crimen sine lege concerns.163 Interpreting
the crimes set out in the Statute with a reference to CIL is
certainly consistent with that concern and leads directly to the
Tadić decision’s embrace of JCE as established by post-World
War II CIL.
Similarly, the hybrid courts have embraced methodologies
that ultimately have led them to the application of CIL and the
acceptance of at least some forms of JCE. This is true whether
the courts are charged with application of domestic and
international law in the form of CIL, e.g., ECCC in Cambodia;
application of domestic and defined international crimes
modeled on the ICTY/ICTR Statutes, which are then
interpreted under CIL, e.g., Sierra Leone, East Timor; or
application of domestic law, which is found to allow or require
the application of international law, including CIL, as a part of
domestic law, e.g., Lebanon).
Finally there is the methodology of interpretation set out in
the Rome Statute of the ICC. Article 21 of that Statute provides
that:
The Court shall apply:
162. ICTY Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (charging the Tribunal with “prosecut[ing]
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law”); ICTR
Statute, supra note 1, art. 1 (charging the Tribunals with “[p]rosecut[ing] . . . Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law”).
163 . Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 50 (“[International
humanitarian law] exists in the form of both conventional and customary law. While
there is international customary law which is not laid down in conventions, some of the
major conventional humanitarian law has become part of customary international
law . . . . In the view of the Secretary General, the application of the principle nullem
crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal shall apply rules of international
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law so that the
problem of adherence of some but not all States to specific conventions does not
arise.”).
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(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable
treaties and the principles and rules of international law,
including the established principles of the international law
of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the
Court from national laws of legal systems of the world,
including, as appropriate, the national laws of states that
would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime,
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this
Statute and with international law and international norms
and standards.164

IV. A PATHWAY TOWARD A COHERENT FRAMEWORK
A. The Merits Decision in Lubanga165
The judgment in the Lubanga case essentially affirms the
PTC’s Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, discussed
above, with what the Separate Opinion refers to as “minor
modifications to ensure compliance with the Statute.”166 Those
modifications do suggest a movement away from the most severe
aspects of the “control theory” of co-perpetration, but it is the
Separate Opinion by Judge Adrian Fulford which is the most
promising in terms of a possible new approach to modes of
liability in the ICC.
Judge Fulford of the United Kingdom agreed that the
control theory of co-perpetration, as modified by the Court’s
opinion is the test that should be applied to this case “as a
matter of fairness,”167 since this test represents the principles of
law on which the trial was prosecuted and defended. However,
he made his view quite clear at the outset of his opinion “that
the test laid down by the Pre-Trial Chamber is unsupported by
164. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21.
165. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgement (March
14, 2012).
166. Id. (separate opinion of Judge Fulford); see Thomas Lieflander, The Lubanga
Judgment of the ICC: More than Just the First Step?, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 191
(discussing how the Trial Chamber modifies the mens rea requirement of the PTC).
167. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 2 (separate opinion of Judge
Fulford).
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the text of the Statute and it imposes an unnecessary and unfair
burden on the prosecution.”168 The Separate Opinion reviewed
the PTC’s holding that under Article 25(3)(a), “liability for
committing a crime ‘jointly with another’ attaches only to
individuals who can be said to have control over the crime.” 169
The PTC’s five part test for establishing such co-perpetrator
liability is “directed at those who have ‘control over the
commission of the offence.’” The five elements as summarized
by Judge Fulford are:
i. The “existence of an agreement or common plan between
two or more persons;
ii. The “coordinated essential contribution made by each
co-perpetrator resulting in the realisation of the objective
elements of the crime;”
iii. “[T]he suspect [must] fulfill the subjective elements of
the crime with which he or she is charged”;
iv. “[T]he suspect and the other co-perpetrators (a) must all
be mutually aware of the risk that implementing their
common plan may result in the realisation of the objective
elements of the crime, and (b) must all mutually accept
such a result by reconciling themselves with it or consenting
to it;” and
v. “[T]he suspect [must be aware] of the factual
circumstances enabling him or her to jointly control the
crime.”170

1. Distinguishing Between Principals and Accessories
Judge Fulford addressed the reasons provided by the PTC
for adopting the control of the crime approach and found them
both wanting and unsupported by the text of the Statute. First,
the PTC founded its adoption of the control theory on the
“perceived necessity to establish a clear dividing line between
the various forms of liability under Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of the
Statute and, in particular, to distinguish between the liability of
‘accessories’ under Article 25(3)(b) and that of ‘principals’

168. Id. para. 3.
169. Id. para. 4 (citing PTC decision, paras. 326–38).
170. Id.
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under Article 25(3)(a).”171 In response, he argued that the plain
text of Article 25(3) “defeats the argument that subsections (a)(d) . . . must be interpreted so as to avoid creating an overlap
between them.”172 In his view, the various provisions of Articles
25(3)(a) (committing a crime through another), and 25(3)(b)
(ordering, soliciting and inducing the commission of a crime),
“will often be indistinguishable in their application vis-à-vis a
particular situation.” 173 He thus concluded that, “in [his]
judgment the plain language of Article 25(3) demonstrates that
the possible modes of commission under Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of
the Statute were not intended to be mutually exclusive.”174 In
support of this view he noted that “the ad hoc tribunals have held
that the various modes of liability available under their statutes
are not mutually exclusive.”175
The Separate Opinion also rejected the notion of
distinguishing the various forms of liability by establishing a
“hierarchy of seriousness that is dependent on creating rigorous
distinctions between the modes of liability within Article
25(3).” 176 While Judge Fulford acknowledged that such a
ranking might be useful if sentencing was strictly determined by
the particular statutory provision on which defendant’s
conviction is based, he noted that such is not the case. The
Rome Statute provisions governing how sentences are to be
imposed (Article 78 and Rule 145 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence) require reference to “all the relevant factors, . . .
including the gravity of the crime and the individual
circumstances of the convicted persons.”177 Although “degree of
participation” is one of the factors to be considered, “these
provisions overall do not narrowly determine the sentencing
range by reference to the mode of liability under which the
accused is convicted, and instead this is simply one of a number
of relevant factors.”178

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. para. 6.
Id. para. 7.
Id.
Id.
Id. para. 8 n.13 (citing both ICTY and ICTR cases in support).
Id. para. 9.
Id. (citing Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 78(1)).
Id.
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Judge Fulford noted the source of the “control theory” of
co-perpetration, as considered earlier in this Article,
characterizing it as an “approach . . . imported directly from the
German legal system.” 179 While acknowledging that “Article
21(1)(c) of the Statute permits the Court to draw upon ‘general
principles of law’ derived from national legal systems,” he
argued that before doing so, “a Chamber should undertake a
careful assessment as to whether the policy considerations
underlying the domestic legal doctrine are applicable at this
Court, and it should investigate the doctrine’s compatibility with
the Rome Statute framework.”180
The PTC here was apparently led astray by its failure to
consider these matters. In adopting the German doctrine, the
PTC failed to take notice of the fact that under the German
legal system a defendant’s sentencing range is determined by
reference to the mode of liability under which he is convicted.
Therefore, precise distinctions between these various modes
take on heightened importance. In the ICC, however, such
considerations are inapplicable.
2. Establishing Principal Liability for Those Who Participate
Remotely
Judge Fulford also rejected this second justification for
adopting the “control theory,” because “a plain reading of
Article 25(3)(a) establishes the criminal liability of coperpetrators who contribute to the commission of the crime
notwithstanding their absence from the scene, and it is
unnecessary to invoke the control of the crime theory in order
to secure this result.”181
In reaching this result, the opinion cited the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1), which
provides that a treaty’s provisions (here those of the Rome
179. Id. para. 10. He does, however, devote some time to detailing the ways in
which the Pre-Trial Chamber’s embrace of the control theory differs from the theory as
described by Professor Roxin. Id.
180. Id. (“This applies regardless of whether the domestic and the ICC provisions
mirror each other in their formulation. It would be dangerous to apply a national
statutory interpretation simply because of similarities of language, given the overall
context is likely to be significantly different.”).
181. Id. para. 12.
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Statute) are to be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with
the[ir] ordinary meaning [ . . .] in their context and in light of
[the Statute’s] object and purpose.”182 In applying this language,
it concludes that the plain meaning “establishes the following
elements for co-perpetration”:
a. The involvement of at least two individuals.
b. Coordination between those who commit the offence,
which may take the form of an agreement, common plan or
joint understanding, express or implied to commit a crime
or to undertake action that in the ordinary course of events,
will lead to the commission of the crime.
c. A contribution to the crime, which may be direct or
indirect, provided either way there is a causal link between
the individual’s contribution and the crime.
d. Intent and knowledge, as defined in Article 30 of the
Statute, or as “otherwise provided” elsewhere in the Court’s
legal framework”183

What the “plain text” of the Statute does not require, in the
view of Judge Fulford, is whether the requirement of awareness
by the accused “that a crime will be committed ‘in the ordinary
course of events’ is to be equated with a ‘possibility’, a
‘probability’, a ‘risk’ or a ‘danger’ (see paragraph 1012 of the
Judgment).”184 Also, he noted that the Statute’s requirement
that the accused “commits” the crime requires “a contribution
to the commission of the crime.”185 However, “[n]othing in the
Statute requires that the contribution must involve direct,
physical participation at the execution stage of the crime, and,
instead, an absent perpetrator may be involved.”186 In any event,
“the word ‘commits’ simply requires an operative link between
the individual’s contribution and the commission of the crime.”
Finally, a plain reading of Article 25(3) “does not require proof
that the crime would not have been committed absent the
accused’s involvement (viz that his role was essential).”187
182. Id. para. 13 (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 18232) (alteration in original).
183. Id. para. 16.
184. Id. para. 15.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (emphasis omitted).

544 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:501
B. The Pathway Forward
1. Building on Judge Fulford’s Opinion
While much of what Judge Fulford says is certainly correct,
his ultimate conclusion that the “plain meaning” of Article 25
(3)(a) provides a clear test is not. He is correct in noting that
“the test laid down by the Pre-Trial Chamber is unsupported by
the text of the Statute.”188 Nothing in the text of that section,
nor in the traveaux preparatoires, supports the control theory of
co-perpetration set out by the majority, with its requirement of
“essential contribution” and its consequent “hypothetical
investigation as to how events might have unfolded without the
accused’s involvement.”189 Nor, as Judge Fulford amply explains,
does that language require each of the possible modes of
participation to be mutually exclusive.
The text of Article 25(3) does not provide a clear test for
determining individual responsibility for collective crimes.
Although it represents a carefully negotiated compromise, that
compromise (as compromises often do) obscures the detail
necessary for a realistically applicable test.190 I do not agree with
those who, prior to the Lubanga decision191 or following that
decision,192 would find in Article 25(3)(a)–(d) a hierarchy of
culpability. Rather, I agree with Judge Fulford that the selfevident overlap of several parts of Article 25(3) suggests that
there was no intention by the drafters to establish such a

188. Id. para. 3
189. Id. para. 17 (“It seems to me to be important to stress that an ex post facto
assessment as to whether an individual made an essential contribution to war crimes,
crimes against humanity or genocide will often be unrealistic and artificial. These
crimes frequently involve a large number of perpetrators, including those who have
controlling roles. It will largely be a matter of guesswork as to the real consequence for
the particular crime if the accused is (hypothetically) removed from the equation, and
most particularly it will not be easy to determine whether the offence would have been
committed in any event.”).
190 . See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Lubanga Decision Roundtable: More on CoPerpetration, OPINIO JURIS, http://www.http://opiniojuris.org/2012/03/16/lubangadecision-roundtable-more-on-co-perpetration/ (“At the outset it should be noted that
Article 25(3)(a) is maddeningly vague.”).
191. See, e.g., Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC
Statute, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 953, 957 (2007) (“Article 25(3)(a)-(d) establishes a value
oriented hierarchy of participation in a crime under international law.”).
192. See e.g., Heller, supra note 190.
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hierarchy.193 Nor should we ignore the heinous nature of crimes
(and the consequent high degree of culpability for those acting
in concert in pursuit of a common plan (as envisioned by
25(3)(d))).194
2. Constraints of Interpretation
The way out of this confusing legal landscape lies in the
rules of interpretation set out in Article 21 of the Rome Statute,
introduced earlier in this article. 195 All of the opinions in
Lubanga, Pre-Trial Chamber and Trial Chamber, purport to rely
upon the first rule of interpretation in Article 21(a) requiring
that the Court shall apply “this Statute, Elements of Crimes, and
its Rules of Procedure and Evidence.” In the Decision on the
Merits, both the majority and Judge Fulford’s Separate Opinion
read the “plain meaning” of this text as definitive and yet, their
readings are diametrically opposed.196 Judge Fulford’s unease
with the majority opinion is clearly warranted, but his proposed
solution is not.
Instead, because of the inherent ambiguity of Article 21(a),
the Court should rely upon the second part of Article 21, which
directs the Court to apply “[i]n the second place, where
appropriate applicable treaties and the principles and rules of
international law, including the established principles of the
international law of armed conflict.” 197 Those “established
principles” arguably include forms of participation as applied in
international, hybrid, and domestic courts since World War II.
Reference should be made to the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
193. Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 8 (separate
opinion of Judge Fulford) (March 14, 2012) (“[T]here is no proper basis for
concluding that ordering, soliciting or inducing a crime (Article 25(3)(b)) is a less
serious form of commission than committing it ‘through another person’ (Article
25(3)(a)), and these two concepts self-evidently overlap.”).
194. I also think that Professor Heller is incorrect in concluding that “Article
25(3)(d) is limited to contributions to a group crime that are made by individuals who
are not members of the group.” Heller, supra note 190. This is certainly not self-evident
from the language of the text, nor from contemporaneous interpretations of its
drafting and is at minimum contradicted by the ICTY’s reliance on this very language
in Tadić to find principal liability for one who was a member of the group.
195. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
196. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 7 (separate opinion of Judge
Fulford).
197. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(b).
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tribunals (ICTY, ICTR, and the various hybrid tribunals
discussed earlier) and consideration given to the widespread
acceptance in those courts of the concept of JCE, at least in its
basic and systemic forms (JCE I and II). The ICC is the outlier
here in terms of defining individual responsibility in the context
of a mass crime.
The current approach by the ICC is problematic on two
levels, as a matter of procedure and on the substance of the
question. First, as stated above, the Court seems to have ignored
the Article 21 methodology of interpretation in failing under
21(b) to consider “principles and rules of international law,
including the established principles of the international law of
armed conflict.” 198 While it might be argued that the latter
phrase refers to the substantive law defining crimes under
international humanitarian law, nothing in the language of
Article 21(b) so limits it. Moreover, previous tribunals
considering this issue have found that customary international
law of armed conflict includes determinations of proper modes
of responsibility. 199 Application of 21(b) would have at least
required the ICC to struggle with whether customary
international law requires application of joint criminal
enterprise in some form, and to explain why it was rejecting that
framework.
If the Court had found that “applicable treaties and the
principles of international law” did not provide a framework for
individual liability for collective crimes, then the 21(c) provision
directs the Court to apply “general principles from national laws
of legal systems of the world.”200 One would expect that such an
application might have considered both civil and common law
doctrines concerning individual responsibility for crimes with
multiple perpetrators. So not only the principally German
“control theory,” but conspiracy and other common plan or
purpose liability as reflected in the national laws of other civil
law and common law systems would have been taken into
consideration. No such exploration takes place in these cases,
where the Chambers settle upon a theory, not only limited to
one such national legal system, but in a form almost wholly
198. Id.
199. See, e.g., supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text.
200. Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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dependent on one scholar’s view. This is a theory not only so
limited, but also, in some of its details, controversial within that
one legal system. Thus, a good argument could be made that the
Chambers erred both procedurally and substantively in their
adoption of the control theory, in failing to consider customary
international law and in failing to justify the adoption of that
theory in the face of alternative, more broadly accepted bases
for liability.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the ICC has to some extent tied its hands in
terms of moving toward forms of participation more in line with
CIL and the decisions of other international courts. In Lubanga,
the Trial Chamber feels itself bound to accept the “control
theory” basis for co-perpetration, because that is the “law of the
case” under which Lubanga was charged and prosecuted. Even
Judge Fulford, who would have the court reject the control
theory, accepts that the Trial Chamber should apply this
standard to the case before it because of the accused’s right to
be informed “in detail of the nature, cause and content of the
charge[s]” 201 against him. This, Judge Fulford concludes,
requires that the accused “needs to be aware of the basic outline
of the legal framework against which [the] facts will be
determined. This ensures that the accused knows at all stages of
the proceeding, what he is expected to meet.”202 Because the
test he proposes using would have made it easier to convict
Lubanga, the control of the crime theory should, he asserts, be
applied. Progress toward a coherent concept of individual
responsibility that encompasses the modes of participation
discussed in this article, will require the Appeals Chamber to
reconsider this position. It is clear it must do so.

201. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, para. 20 (separate opinion of Judge
Fulford).
202. Id.

